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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
WENDALYN ENCE, nka 
WENDALYN SMITH, 
Plaintiff /Appellant, 
vs. 
LARRY D. ENCE, : 
Defendant/Appellee. : 
Case No. 981707-CA 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Comes now the appellant to the above-captioned matter (hereinafter "wife"), by 
and through counsel, and submits the following as her Reply Brief of Appellant herein: 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS MAKE IT IMPOSSIBLE TO CONCLUDE 
THAT THE AMOUNT OF ALIMONY AWARDED IN THIS CASE IS 
REASONABLE 
Defendant/Appellee, Larry D. Ence, (hereinafter "husband"), contends that wife 
has failed to marshall any evidence in support of the trial court's findings that husband's 
need for alimony should be based on the parties' standard of living earned in 1987 and 
that husband is unable to earn more than $12.00 per hour. 
Wife respectfully submits that she has marshaled the evidence in support of her 
contention that the evidence is inadequate to sustain the large alimony awarded in this 
case. However, most of the trial court's findings regarding the issues of alimony are so 
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inadequate that the Appellate Court cannot know how the trial court reached its decision 
on the amount of alimony it awarded. 
Since Findings of Facts are subject to a clearly erroneous standard of review, wife 
must show the findings are against the clear weight of the evidence. Woodward v. 
Fazzio, 823 P.2d 474, 477 (Utah App. 1991). A finding is clearly erroneous when, even 
though there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court is left with the definite and 
firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Schindler v. Schindler, 776 P.2d 84 (Utah 
App. 1989). The findings must be sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary 
facts to clearly show the steps the trial court took to reach its conclusion on each factual 
issue. Carlton v. Carlton, 756 P.2d 86, 89 (Utah App. 1988). In otherwords, there must 
be a logical and legal basis for the ultimate conclusion which set forth the basic facts, 
showing why that ultimate conclusion is justified. Smith v Smith, 726 P.2d 423, 426 
(Utah 1986). If findings are inadequate, the broad deference owed to the trial court is no 
longer guaranteed and there is no need to marshal the evidence. Woodward v. Fazzio, at 
477. (holding that the conclusionary statements made by the trial court provided no 
insight to the evidentiary basis for the trial courts decision, making appellate review 
ineffective and there was no need to marshal the evidence when the findings were so 
inadequate. 
Even though the specific findings on the parties' income during eight years of the 
marriage appear to be detailed and undisputed, there is no indication how the court 
reached its ultimate decision to award $1,500.00 per month for four years and $800.00 
per month for seventeen more years. This total amount of alimony awarded has no 
discernable bases in the evidence other than the court believed it would give husband a 
2 
standard of living based on the income earned by the parties in 1987, a "fair benchmark" 
to establish the standard of living during the whole twenty-one years of marriage 
(Finding of Fact #25). The critical question concerning the amount of income husband 
will need each month is omitted. At a minimum, the court must establish need; it cannot 
logically conclude husband needs the amount of alimony awarded without first 
establishing what his needs are. This it failed to do. Even if the income earned in 1987 
was somehow considered a fair benchmark of the parties' standard of living, there is no 
insight to the evidentiary basis for the court's decision on the alimony award. It cannot 
be assumed that the amount of alimony awarded is reasonable. A logical and legal basis 
for the award is lacking. 
The facts addressing the issue of alimony as stated in the Amended Findings of 
Fact, numbers 16-24, do not provide a logical or legal basis for the alimony award, nor do 
they show the steps the court took to reach its ultimate conclusion. The court recites the 
facts from the testimony and exhibits at trial: 
(#16) Since 1956, and throughout the parties' marriage, Respondent has 
been employed full-time as a heavy equipment operator. Although his 
salary fluctuated, Respondent earned as much as $18.52 per hour during the 
parties' marriage. Petitioner supplemented the family income in secretarial 
positions prior to entering school full-time. While the parties' children were 
young, Petitioner was the primary care giver and also worked part-time at 
home as a typist. 
(# 17) In January 1981, Petitioner entered college at Glendale Community 
College, later transferring to Grand Canyon University. After her first 
semester of college Petitioner did not work outside of the home until she 
graduated with her undergraduate degree in May of 1985. Petitioner's 
undergraduate education was financed through two loans, totaling $6,000.00 
and some scholarships. Petitioner paid off the loans in December, 1991 
with post residency earnings. 
(#18) From 1985-1987, Petitioner worked as an estimator for an industrial 
trust company and as a substitute teacher. She earned approximately 
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$15,000 per year. In 1987 the parties earned $51,000 jointly. (Note: this is a 
two year period since wife graduated from college in May 1985 and entered 
medical school in June, 1987) 
(#19) The parties lived in a mobile home until they purchased a small 
home when their children were young. When the parties moved to Phoenix, 
Arizona in 1980, they sold that home for approximately $32,000.00 and 
purchased a single 14x70 mobile home. They lived together in the mobile 
home until Petitioner moved with the children to Tucson, Arizona, in 1987 
to attend medical school. 
(#20) Petitioner was accepted into medical school at the University of 
Arizona in Tucson in 1987. The parties purchased a home in Tucson and 
Petitioner moved there with the two children. During the week Respondent 
stayed in a travel trailer in phoenix and traveled home on weekends. 
(#21) Petitioner borrowed approximately $49,000.00 in student loans to 
finance her medical education, and contributed an average of $6,500.00 per 
year from the loans to meet family expenses. The majority of family 
expenses were paid by the Respondent's earnings, which were 
approximately $18.52 per hour when Petitioner began medical school and 
were $15.00 per hour when Petitioner graduated and the parties moved to 
Ogden. The income history of the family during the Petitioner's time in 
medical school is as follows: $41,000 in 1988, $36,000 in 1989, $36,000 in 
1990, and $30,000 in 1991. 
(#22) Petitioner graduated from medical school in May 1991 and the 
parties moved to Ogden, Utah, to allow Petitioner to complete her internship 
and residency requirements at McKay Dee Hospital. The parties rented a 
home in Ogden for $745.00 per month. Respondent was unable to find 
suitable employment in Utah and he then remained home to care for their 
teenage children. The parties' earned $34,000 in 1992, $57,000 in 1993, 
and $100,000 in 1994. 
(#23) Until the parties' 1994 vacation in Alaska, vacations were infrequent 
and were spent visiting relatives. They purchased moderately priced cars 
and did not buy expensive clothing. The parties' major asset at the time of 
trial was their home in Tucson, Arizona. 
(#24) At the time of trial, Petitioner was living in the rented four bedroom 
Ogden home and Respondent was renting a camp trailer from a cousin in St. 
George, Utah for $500.00 per month. Although Respondent argued he was 
unable to move into an apartment on his current income, the court 
questioned that assertion. 
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The findings state such facts as the work history and income of the parties during 
the last eight years, where they lived, wife's contribution to the family's income when 
she attended school and how their lifestyle was modest. (FOF #25) Some of these 
findings, are specific, detailed and not disputed. However, the findings give no 
indication how the court reached its ultimate decision on the alimony award or why it 
decided to base the award on the standard of living earned in 1987. The court only found 
that an award of alimony should allow husband to sustain a comparable standard of 
living. (FOF #25) Nowhere do the findings specify how much income husband needs on 
a monthly basis to sustain a comparable standard of living earned in 1987. The court's 
findings of fact, therefore, are inadequate and conclusionary and do not clearly show the 
steps the trial court took in arriving at the large alimony award. 
The Amended Findings of Facts #26-29 may appear to justify the court's finding 
that husband was limited to earning $12.00 per hour. The court noted that husband, 56 
years old at the time of trial, worked as a heavy equipment operator sinceel956 and had 
no formal education beyond high school. (FOF #26) The court found that husband gave 
up his union position in Arizona when he moved to Utah and, since he was no longer able 
to get his old job back or find similar union employment that he gave up when he moved 
to Utah, that he was limited to earning $12.00 per hour or $2,080.00 gross and $1,600.00 
net per month in St. George, Utah. (FOF #27) The court further found that husband's 
age and skills limit him to a position as heavy equipment operator and make him unable 
to produce income greater than $12.00 per hour. (FOF #28) Yet, in an obvious 
contradiction, the court found " . . .but for the parties' move to Utah, Respondent would 
be earning between $15 per hour, and $17 per hour, or $2,497 per month." (FOF #29) 
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These findings are generally conclusionary, with no supporting facts showing 
why husband was not able to find suitable employment in Arizona and why he was 
limited to a job that would pay no more than $12 per hour other than that his age and 
experience limited him. The court ignored the evidence showing husband's experience in 
various jobs for a long period of time. We do not even know whether or not $12 per hour 
was top union pay in Utah at the time. Furthermore, the court adjusted for inflation when 
considering how much per hour husband would earn if he had stayed working in Arizona 
but failed to make the same adjustment when it found that husband was limited to earning 
$12 per hour in St. George, Utah. Was it even necessary to stay in Utah? 
In Finding of Fact #30, the court thoroughly considered husbands retirement 
benefits and awarded half to wife instead of awarding husband his full retirement benefits 
to offset any award of alimony that may have been fair and equitable. 
The court anticipated that husbands monthly expenses would remain relatively 
constant even after his retirement and, therefore, it found it necessary to continue alimony 
past his retirement to continue for 21 years. (FOF #30) This finding is also 
conclusionary. There were no findings as to what husband's monthly expenses are or 
will be; the finding that expenses will remain relatively constant even after his retirement 
is pure speculation. 
The court further found that the marriage was of long duration and that wife's 
earning capacity has been greatly enhanced through the efforts of both spouses during the 
marriage. (FOF #34) Even though the court found that wife earned her medical degree 
through personal determination and sacrifice, it found that it could not ignore husband's 
efforts to assist her. The court listed specific facts in support of husband's efforts such as 
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providing the infrastructure that supported her in her accustomed lifestyle while she 
attended school, paying for the bulk of the household expenses, including the payment on 
the house in Tucson, enabling wife to spend increased time at the school and hospital by 
hiring a nanny. (FOF #34a) The court further found that wife contributed less to the 
family income during her schooling than she had previously, (FOF #34b), and wife and 
the children lived in the family's home in Tucson while husband lived in a travel trailer 
on his parent's property in Phoenix. (FOF #34c) There was no evidence that husband 
supported two households as he contends, living on his parents property in a trailer. 
Nowhere in the findings does the court consider the three and one-half years that 
husband did not work while wife was the sole support of the family and husband not only 
contribute less to the family income, he contributed nothing. Furthermore, the court 
failed to consider wife's sacrifices during the time she was in medical school, when 
husband stayed in Phoenix instead of helping her in Tucson where it was necessary to 
hire a live-in first year medical student to care for the children. 
The court found that a compensating adjustment was appropriate without 
mentioning specific underlying facts in support of this finding including the amount it 
was awarding. It found the intangible emotional support or encouragement provided to 
wife, and the sacrifices husband made on wife's behalf, caused wife's earning capacity to 
be greatly enhanced due to the efforts of both spouses during the marriage. (FOF #35-36) 
Yet, while it found that joint efforts made wife's education possible, it emphasized that 
clearly wife's achievement is due in large part to her own extended efforts. (FOF #39) 
There is no way of knowing how it arrived at these findings. 
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The award of alimony was necessary to restore husband to the standard of living 
enjoyed during the marriage and to compensate him for his contribution to her increased 
earning capacity; it would enable him to establish a level of housing and personal 
property ownership that will allow him to maintain the lifestyle enjoyed by the parties 
during the marriage. (FOF #40-41) Again, these findings are conclusionary for they do 
not show how much income husband needs to restore him to an unspecified standard of 
living. 
II. WIFE IS NOT PRECLUDED FROM CHALLENGING THE FINDINGS 
ABSENT ALLEDGED FRAUD OF THE COURT. 
Husband argues that wife is precluded from challenging the findings of the trial 
court apparently because wife drafted the findings adopted from the trial and included 
therein no mention of the material allegation of fact raised at trial, and, therefore, is 
deemed to have waived any objection to the failure of the trial court to make such a 
finding. (Appellee's Brief P.16-17) Husband's argument is misplaced. 
The trial court actually prepared the amended findings of fact in its decision after 
remand from the Court of Appeals, which has been entered in the record. The Amended 
Findings of Fact prepared by wife incorporates verbatim the language of the court. 
Furthermore, and more importantly, the Utah Supreme Court has held that in a 
proceeding in equity, such as in this case, failure to object to the trial court's findings of 
fact is not fatal to appellant to appeal and the reviewing court is free to review both the 
facts and the law as found and applied by the trial court. Dugan v. Jones, 724 P.2d 955 
(Utah 1986). 
8 
CONCLUSION 
In light of the lack of evidence available to support the alimony award, this 
reviewing court should conclude that the trial court erroneously determined that husband 
was entitled to the amount of alimony awarded, if any. The present alimony award 
represents a long term interest in wife's earning potential. Husband did not suffer 
economic disadvantage by the divorce. Since the above findings of fact were the only 
evidence supporting husband's need and ability to earn, this court should reverse and 
remand for a dismissal of the alimony award. 
Respectfully submitted this ^ day of July, 1999. 
CAROLYN D. ^Ey/HEN 
Attorney for Appellant, 
Wendalyn Smith 
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